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Abstract Hypothesis testing is a central statisti-
cal method in psychology and the cognitive sciences.
However, the problems of null hypothesis significance
testing (NHST) and p-values have been debated widely,
but few attractive alternatives exist. This article in-
troduces the fbst R package, which implements the
Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) to test a
sharp null hypothesis against its alternative via the
e-value. The statistical theory of the FBST has been
introduced by Pereira and Stern (1999) more than
two decades ago and since then, the FBST has shown
to be a Bayesian alternative to NHST and p-values
with both theoretical and practical highly appealing
properties. The algorithm provided in the fbst pack-
age is applicable to any Bayesian model as long as
the posterior distribution can be obtained at least
numerically. The core function of the package pro-
vides the Bayesian evidence against the null hypoth-
esis, the e-value. Additionally, p-values based on asymp-
totic arguments can be computed and rich visualisa-
tions for communication and interpretation of the re-
sults can be produced. Three examples of frequently
used statistical procedures in the cognitive sciences
are given in this paper which demonstrate how to
apply the FBST in practice using the fbst pack-
age. Based on the success of the FBST in statisti-
cal science, the fbst package should be of interest
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to a broad range of researchers in psychology and
the cognitive sciences and hopefully will encourage
researchers to consider the FBST as a possible alter-
native when conducting hypothesis tests of a sharp
null hypothesis.
Keywords Full Bayesian Significance Test · e-
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significance testing (NHST) · R package
Introduction
Hypothesis testing is a widely used method in the
cognitive sciences and in experimental psychology.
However, the recently experienced replication crisis
troubles experimental sciences and the underlying
problems are still widely debated (Wagenmakers and
Pashler, 2012; Pashler and Harris, 2012; Wasserstein
et al., 2019; Haaf et al., 2019). Among the identified
problems is the inappropriate use and interpreta-
tion of p-values, which are used in combination with
null hypothesis significance tests (NHST) (Benjamin
and Berger, 2019; Benjamin et al., 2018; Colquhoun,
2014, 2017). As a consequence, in 2016 the American
Statistical Association issued a statement about the
identified problems and recommended to consider al-
ternatives to p-values or supplement data analysis
with further measures of evidence:
“All these measures and approaches rely on
further assumptions, but they may more di-
rectly address the size of an effect (and its as-
sociated uncertainty) or whether the hypoth-
esis is correct.”
(Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016, p. 132)
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2Due to the problems with NHST and p-values, the
editors of Basic and Applied Social Psychology even
decided to ban p-values and NHST completely from
their journal.
In the recent literature various proposals have
been made how to improve the reproducibility of re-
search and the quality of statistical data analysis,
in particular the reliability of statistical hypothesis
tests. These proposals range from stricter thresholds
for stating statistical significance (Benjamin et al.,
2018) to more profound methodological changes (Kr-
uschke and Liddell, 2018a; Wagenmakers et al., 2016;
Morey et al., 2016b). In the last category, an often
stated solution is a shift towards Bayesian data anal-
ysis (Wagenmakers et al., 2016; Kruschke and Lid-
dell, 2018a; Kruschke et al., 2012; Ly et al., 2016a,b).
The advantages of such a shift include the adher-
ence of Bayesian methods to the likelihood princi-
ple (Birnbaum, 1962), which has important implica-
tions. Some of them are the simplified interpretation
and appealing properties of Bayesian interval esti-
mates for quantifying the uncertainty in parameter
estimates (Morey et al., 2016a). Others are given by
the independence of results of the researcher’s in-
tentions (Kruschke and Liddell, 2018b; Berger and
Wolpert, 1988; Edwards et al., 1963) as well as the
ability to make use of optional stopping (Rouder,
2014). The last property is, in particular, appealing
in practical research, as it allows to stop recruiting
participants and report the results based on the col-
lected data in case they already show overwhelm-
ing evidence. Notice that this is not permitted when
making use of NHST and p-values, which can lead to
financial and ethical problems, in particular in the
biomedical and psychological sciences.
Considering Bayesian alternatives to NHST and
p-values, the most prominent approach to Bayesian
hypothesis testing is the Bayes factor which was in-
vented by Jeffreys (1931), see also Etz and Wagen-
makers (2015). The Bayes factor is often advocated
as a Bayesian alternative to the frequentist p-value
when it comes to hypothesis testing, in particular
in the cognitive sciences and psychology (Van De
Schoot et al., 2017; Wagenmakers et al., 2016, 2010;
Ly et al., 2016b; van Doorn et al., 2019; van Don-
gen et al., 2019). However, there are also other ap-
proaches like Bayesian equivalence testing based on
the region of practical equivalence (ROPE) (Kruschke,
2013, 2015; Kruschke and Liddell, 2018b; Kruschke,
2018; Westlake, 1976; Kirkwood and Westlake, 1981;
Kelter, 2020a; Liao et al., 2020) which are based on
an analogy to frequentist equivalence tests (Lakens,
2017; Lakens et al., 2018). Also, there exist various
other measures and alternatives to test hypotheses in
the Bayesian approach, including the MAP-based p-
value (Mills, 2017), the probability of direction (PD)
(Makowski et al., 2019b,a) and the Full Bayesian
Significance Test (FBST) (Pereira and Stern, 1999;
Stern, 2003; Madruga et al., 2001, 2003; Pereira et al.,
2008; Pereira and Stern, 2020; Esteves et al., 2019).
In contemporary literature, there is still a debate
about which Bayesian measure to use in which set-
ting for scientific hypothesis testing, and while some
authors argue in favour of the Bayes factor (Wagen-
makers et al., 2016; Etz and Vandekerckhove, 2016;
Kelter, 2020b), there is also criticism about the focus
on the Bayes factor in the cognitive sciences (Ten-
deiro and Kiers, 2019; Greenland, 2019). By now,
comparisons of different Bayesian posterior indices
are rare, but the existing results show that it is use-
ful to consider various different Bayesian approaches
to hypothesis testing depending on the research goal
and study design, see Kelter (2020a); Makowski et al.
(2019b); Liao et al. (2020).
In this paper, attention is directed to one spe-
cific Bayesian alternative to NHST and p-values, the
Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) and the e-
value, and the R package fbst is introduced. The
FBST has been developed over two decades ago in
the statistical literature (Pereira and Stern, 1999),
and since has been employed successfully in a broad
range of scientific areas and applications. It is not
possible to cover all theoretical and practical work
which has been pursued concerning the FBST in the
last two decades, and for a concise review, we re-
fer the reader to Pereira and Stern (2020). The R
package fbst introduced in this paper offers an intu-
itive and widely applicable software implementation
of the FBST and the e-value. The package has been
designed to work in combination with widely used R
packages for fitting Bayesian models in the cognitive
sciences and psychology and offers appealing visual-
isations to communicate and share the results of an
analysis with colleagues.
The structure of this paper is as follows: First,
we describe the underlying theory of the FBST and
the e-value. Second, we give information about the
available functionality and software implementation
of the package. Subsequently, we demonstrate with
two examples of widely used statistical models in
psychological research how the FBST can be applied
in practice via the fbst package. Finally, we con-
clude by drawing attention to the benefits and limi-
tations of the package and give some ideas about fu-
3ture extensions. In summary, the FBST and e-value
could be an appealing Bayesian alternative to NHST
and p-values which has been widely under-utilised by
now in the cognitive sciences and psychology. This
clearly can be attributed to the dearth of accessi-
ble software implementations, one of which is pre-
sented in form of the R package introduced in this
paper. The fbst package hopefully will foster critical
discussion and reflection about different approaches
to Bayesian hypothesis testing and allow to pursue
further research to investigate the relationship be-
tween different posterior indices for significance and
effect size (Kelter, 2020a; Makowski et al., 2019b;
Liao et al., 2020).
The FBST and the e-value
This section describes the statistical theory behind
the FBST and the e-value in more detail. The philo-
sophical basis (or conceptual approach) is first de-
scribed briefly, and subsequently, the necessary no-
tation is introduced.
Conceptual approach of the FBST
The Full Bayesian Significance Test was first intro-
duced by Pereira and Stern (1999) more than two
decades ago as a Bayesian alternative to traditional
frequentist null hypothesis significance tests. It was
invented to test a sharp (or precise) point null hy-
pothesis H0 against its alternative H1.
Traditional frequentist approaches measure the
inconsistency of the observed data with a null hy-
pothesis H0 (Kempthorne, 1976; Cox et al., 1977).
Frequentist hypothesis tests employ p-values to or-
der the sample space according to increasing incon-
sistency with the hypothesis. Notice, that a p-value
is defined as the probability of obtaining a result
(which, of course, is located in the sample space)
equal to or more extreme than the one observed un-
der the assumption of the null hypothesis H0 (Held
and Sabane´s Bove´, 2014). In contrast, the e-value
produced in the FBST aims at ordering the parame-
ter space according to increasing inconsistency with
the observed data (Pereira et al., 2008). In formu-
las, traditional frequentist significance tests use the
p-value to reject the null hypothesis H0:
p = Pr(x ∈ C|θ0)
Here, C often is the set of sample space values x ∈ X
(where X is the sample space) for which a test statis-
tic Tθ0 (derived under the assumption of the null
hypothesis value θ0) is at least as large as the test
statistic value t calculated from the observed data.
The set C can be interpreted as the sample space
values x ∈ X which are at least as inconsistent with
the null hypothesis H0 as the observed data. The p-
value now quantifies the evidence against H0 by cal-
culating the probability of sample space values x be-
ing located precisely in this set (Casella and Berger,
2002).
The idea put forward in Pereira and Stern (1999)
and Pereira et al. (2008) is simple: Instead of con-
sidering the sample space, a Bayesian should inspect
the tangential set T of parameter values (which are,
of course, located in the parameter space). This set
consists of all parameter values which are more con-
sistent with the observed data x than θ0, which is
the Bayesian evidence ev. Here, ev is defined as
ev = Pr(θ ∈ T |x)
and ev = 1−ev. ev can be interpreted as the evidence
in favour of the null hypothesis H0, while ev is inter-
preted as the evidence against H0. This latter value
is the probability of all parameter values θ which are
more consistent with the data x than the null value
θ0. The conceptual approach of the FBST consists,
as a consequence, of constructing a duality Bayesian
theory and frequentist sampling theory. This duality
is constructed between frequentist significance mea-
sures which are based on ordering the sample space
according to increasing inconsistency with the data,
and the Bayesian e-value, which is based on ordering
the parameter space according to increasing inconsis-
tency with the observed data. This conceptual basis
ensures that the FBST allows a seamless transition
to Bayesian data analysis for researchers who are ac-
quainted with NHST and p-values. The FBST pro-
duces the e-value which can be interpreted similarly
to the frequentist p-value and little methodological
changes are required. However, the consequences of
the conceptual basis of the FBST are substantial:
As the quantity ev is a fully Bayesian quantity, it al-
lows statements in terms of probability to quantify
the evidence. Traditional frequentist measures like
p-values do not make probabilistic statements about
the parameter (because they are computed over the
sample space instead of the parameter space), which
is questionable as the goal of the study or experi-
ment is to quantify the uncertainty about a given
research hypothesis, which naturally should be done
4via probability measures (Howie, 2002; Berger and
Wolpert, 1988). As a consequence, the FBST and the
e-value follow the likelihood principle (Birnbaum,
1962; Basu, 1975; Berger and Wolpert, 1988), which
brings several advantages with it:
– Researchers can use optional stopping. This means
that they are allowed to stop recruiting partici-
pants or even abort an experiment and readily
report the results when only a fraction of the
data already shows overwhelming evidence for or
against the hypothesis under consideration (Ed-
wards et al., 1963; Rouder, 2014).
– Censored data (which are often observed in lon-
gitudinal studies or clinical trials in the cogni-
tive sciences and psychology) can be interpreted
easily (Berger and Wolpert, 1988). The likeli-
hood contribution of a single observation in a
study where no censoring was possible is equal
to the likelihood contribution of a single observa-
tion in a study where censoring is possible but did
not occur (for the single observation considered).
This simplifies the analysis and interpretation of
statistical models which include censoring mech-
anisms, see (Berger and Wolpert, 1988, Chapter
4).
– As highlighted by Edwards et al. (1963), Wa-
genmakers et al. (2016), and Kruschke (2018),
the result of a hypothesis test (in this case, the
FBST), is not influenced by the researchers’ in-
tentions. This last property is substantial for im-
proving the reliability of research in the cogni-
tive sciences and psychology, see McElreath and
Smaldino (2015).
Statistical theory of the FBST
In this section we introduce the necessary mathemat-
ical notation for a rigid understanding of the FBST.
The FBST can be used with any standard paramet-
ric statistical model, where θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rp is a (vector-
valued) parameter of interest, p(x|θ) is the model
likelihood and p(θ) is the prior distribution for the
parameter θ of interest. A sharp (or expressed equiv-
alently, precise) hypothesis H0 makes a statement
about the parameter θ: Specifically, the null hypoth-
esisH0 states that θ lies in the so-called null set ΘH0 .
For simple point null hypotheses like H0 : θ = θ0,
which are often used in practice, this null set con-
sists of the single parameter value θ0 so that the
null set can be written as ΘH0 = {θ0}. As detailed
in the previous section, the conceptual approach of
the FBST is to state the Bayesian evidence against
H0, the e-value. This value is the proposed Bayesian
replacement of the traditional p-value. To construct
the e-value, Pereira et al. (2008) introduced the pos-
terior surprise function s(θ) which is defined as fol-
lows:
s(θ) :=
p(θ|x)
r(θ)
(1)
The surprise function s(θ) is the ratio of the pos-
terior distribution p(θ|x) and a suitable reference
function r(θ). The first thing to note is that two
important special cases are given by a flat reference
function r(θ) = 1 or any prior distribution p(θ) for
the parameter θ. First, when a flat reference function
is selected the surprise function recovers the poste-
rior distribution p(θ|x). Second, when any prior dis-
tribution is used as the reference function, one can
interpret parameter values θ with a surprise function
value s(θ) ≥ 1 as being corroborated by the observed
data x. In contrast, parameter values θ with a sur-
prise function s(θ) < 1 indicate that they have not
been corroborated by the data. The next step is to
calculate the supremum s∗ of the surprise function
s(θ) over the null set ΘH0 .
s∗ := s(θ∗) = sup
θ∈ΘH0
s(θ)
This supremum is subsequently used in combination
with the tangential set, which has been introduced
in the last section. Pereira et al. (2008) defined
T (ν) := {θ ∈ Θ|s(θ) ≤ ν} (2)
and the tangential set T (ν) to the sharp null hypoth-
esis H0 is then given as follows:
T (ν) := Θ \ T (ν) (3)
When setting ν = s∗, the tangential set T (ν) has
its unique interpretation which has been discussed
in the previous section: While T (s∗) includes all pa-
rameter values θ which are smaller or equal to the
supremum value s∗ of the surprise function s(θ), the
tangential set T (s∗) includes all parameter values θ
which attain a larger surprise function value than
the supremum s∗ of the null set.
The final step to obtain the e-value, the Bayesian
evidence against H0, is to make use of the cumulative
surprise function W (ν)
W (ν) :=
∫
T (ν)
p(θ|x)dθ (4)
5The cumulative surprise function W (ν) is simply
an integral of the posterior distribution p(θ|x) over
all parameter values with surprise function values
s(θ) ≤ ν. Setting ν = s∗, the cumulative surprise
function W (s∗) becomes the integral of the poste-
rior p(θ|x) over T (s∗). This is the integral of the
posterior p(θ|x) over all parameter values which have
a surprise function value s(θ) ≤ s∗. The e-value is
then given as
ev(H0) := W (s
∗) (5)
Here W (ν) := 1 −W (ν). Figure 1a visualises the
FBST and the e-value ev(H0). The solid line shows
the posterior distribution p(δ|x) of the effect size δ
after observing the data x, and is produced by a
Bayesian two-sample t-test (Kelter, 2020d). A flat
reference function r(δ) = 1 was selected in figure 1a.
The supremum over the null set ΘH0 = {0} is s∗ =
s(0), shown as the blue point. The horizontal blue
dashed line visualises the boundary between T (0)
and T (0), and values with posterior density p(δ) >
p(0) are located in T (0), while values with p(δ) ≤
p(0) are located in T (0). The blue shaded area is
the cumulative surprise function W (0), which is the
integral over the tangential set T (0) against H0 :
δ = 0. This is the e-value ev(H0) against H0, the
Bayesian evidence against the sharp null hypothesis.
The red shaded area is the integral W (0) over T (0),
which equals the e-value ev(H0) in favour of H0 :
δ = 0. Figure 1b shows the same situation, but now
the reference function is selected as a wide Cauchy
prior C(0, 1), so that the surprise function becomes
s(δ) = p(δ|x)/c(δ)
where c(δ) is the p.d.f. of the C(0, 1) Cauchy dis-
tribution. Although the situation seems similar to
figure 1a, the scaling on the y-axis now is different.
Also, the evidence has changed based on the new
surprise function and the interpretation of the sur-
prise function has changed, too. While in figure 1a,
the surprise function could be interpreted as the pos-
terior distribution, now it is interpreted as follows:
If one assumes a Cauchy prior C(0, 1) on the effect
size δ, then parameters with a surprise function value
s(δ) ≥ 1 can be interpreted as being corroborated by
the data. Parameter values with a surprise function
s(δ) < 1 are interpreted as not being corroborated
by the data.
Pereira and Stern (1999) formally defined the e-
value ev(H0) in support of H0 as
ev(H0) := 1− ev(H0) (6)
but notice that one can not interpret this value as
evidence against H1. This can be attributed to the
fact that H1 is not even a sharp hypothesis, see Def-
inition 2.2 in Pereira et al. (2008).
It is crucial to note that it is not possible to utilise
the e-value ev(H0) to confirm the null hypothesis H0
(Kelter, 2020a). However, the FBST can be general-
ized in to an extended framework which then allows
for hypothesis confirmation and itself is an active
topic of ongoing research (Esteves et al., 2019). Ad-
ditionally, the e-value ev(H0) can be used to reject
H0 if ev(H0) is sufficiently small based on asymptotic
arguments (Pereira et al., 2008, Section 5). Pereira
et al. (2008) showed that the distribution of the e-
value is a Chi-square distribution
ev(H0) ∼ χ2k(||m−M ||2) (7)
where M is the posterior mode calculated over the
entire parameter space Θ and m is the posterior
maximum over ΘH0 . The p-value associated with the
Bayesian evidence in support ofH0 is then calculated
as the superior tail of the χ2 density with k − h de-
grees of freedom, starting from −2λ(m0). Here, k
is the dimension of the parameter space Θ and h
is the dimension of the null set ΘH0 . The quantity
m0 is the observed value and λ(t) = ln l(t) is the
logarithm of the relative likelihood function, where
l(t) = L(t)/L(M) is the relative likelihood. Denot-
ing Fk−h as the Chi-square distribution’s cumula-
tive distribution function with k− h degrees of free-
dom (Fk analogue), the p-value associated with the
Bayesian e-value ev(H0) is then computed as
pv0 = 1− Fk−h(−2λ(m0)) (8)
This latter p-value has a frequentist interpretation.
The p-value based on equation (7) can be expressed
as
ev0 = Fk(||m0 −M0||2) (9)
and can be interpreted as a Bayesian significance
value which quantifies the probability of obtaining
ev(H0) or even less evidence in support of the null
hypothesisH0. Consequently, after observingm0 and
M0 one only needs to calculate the euclidian dis-
tance d0 = ||m0−M0||2 and the value of the χ2k dis-
tribution’s cumulative distribution function of this
distance is the corresponding p-value. Based on a
threshold (like 0.05) one can decide to reject the null
hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 or not.
However, if a p-value is required which is clos-
est to the frequentist p-value in interpretation, one
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Fig. 1 The FBST and the e-value ev(H0) against H0 : δ = 0 in a Bayesian two-sample t-test, where δ is the effect
size. (a): A flat reference function r(δ) = 1 is used, and the solid line is the resulting posterior distribution p(δ|x)
after observing the data. The supremum over the null set s∗ = 0 is visualised as the blue point. The blue shaded area
corresponds to the cumulative surprise function W (0), which is the integral over the tangential set T (0) of H0 : δ = 0.
This is the e-value ev(H0) against H0. The red area is the integral W (0) over T (0), and equals the e-value ev(H0) in
favour of H0 : δ = 0. (b): The same situation as in (a), but now a Cauchy C(0, 1) prior has been used as reference
function r(δ).
should use the standardized e-value sev(H0), as de-
fined in (Borges and Stern, 2007, Section 2.2) and
in (Pereira and Stern, 2020, Section 3.3). The stan-
dardized e-value is defined as:
sev(H0) = Fk−h(F−1k (ev))
Here, F−1k is the quantile function of the cumulative
distribution function of the χ2k distribution with k
degrees of freedom. sev(H0) can, as a consequence,
be interpreted as the probability of obtaining less
evidence than ev(H0) against the null hypothesisH0.
Defining
sev(H0) = 1− sev(H0)
sev(H0) can then be interpreted as the probability
of obtaining ev(H0) or more evidence against H0,
which is closely related to the interpretation of a
frequentist p-value. However, the p-value operates in
the sample space while the standardized e-value op-
erates in the parameter space. The standardized e-
value can be used as a Bayesian replacement of the
frequentist p-value, while being very similar in in-
terpretation. For theoretical properties of sev(H0)
see Borges and Stern (2007) and Pereira and Stern
(2020).
In the examples below, the Bayesian evidence
against H0, the e-value ev(H0) is reported and also
the standardized e-values sev(H0) are given.
Overview and functionality of the fbst pack-
age
The centerpiece of the fbst package is the fbst()
function, which is used to perform the FBST. In ad-
dition to the fbst() function, the package provides
customised summary() and plot() functions which
allow users to print the results of a FBST or ob-
tain a visualisation of their results to communicate
and share the results. The fbst() function has the
following structure:
Listing 1 The fbst() function
1 fbst(posteriorDensityDraws ,
nullHypothesisValue , FUN , par ,
2 dimensionTheta , dimensionNullset)
Here, posteriorDensityDraws needs to be a nu-
meric vector holding the posterior parameter draws
7obtained via MCMC or any other numerical method
of choice.1 The argument nullHypothesisValue is
the value specified in the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0,
and dimensionTheta is the dimension of the param-
eter space Θ. dimensionNullset is the dimension of
the null set ΘH0 , and FUN and par are additional ar-
guments which only need to be specified when a user-
defined reference function r(θ) is desired. In general,
FUN should be the name of the reference function
which should be used and par should be a list of pa-
rameters which this reference function utilises (e.g.
the location and scale parameters when the reference
function is a Cauchy prior). Details will be given in
the examples below.
The fbst() function returns an object of the
class fbst, which stores several useful details and
the results of the conducted FBST. To obtain a con-
cise summary of the FBST, the summary() function
of the class fbst can be used. To visualise the FBST,
the plot() function of the fbst class can be used.
Details are provided in the examples below.
From an algorithmic perspective, the fbst pack-
age proceeds via the following steps when computing
the e-value via the fbst() function:
1. Based on the posterior parameter samples
posteriorDensityDraws, the posterior density
p(θ|x) is estimated via a Gaussian kernel density
estimator, resulting in a posterior density esti-
mate pˆ(θ|x). The Gaussian kernel is used due
to well-known Bayesian asymptotics of posterior
distributions, the Bernstein-von-Mises theorem
(Held and Sabane´s Bove´, 2014).
2. Based on this posterior density estimate pˆ(θ|x),
the surprise function s(θ) is estimated (i) as the
posterior density estimate pˆ(θ|x) if no arguments
FUN and par are supplied so that a flat reference
function r(θ) = 1 is used as default, or (ii) as the
ratio pˆ(θ|x)/r(θ) if arguments FUN and par are
supplied. The result is a surprise function esti-
mate sˆ(θ).
3. The surprise function estimate sˆ(θ) is evaluated
at the null hypothesis value supplied via the ar-
gument nullHypothesisValue, resulting in the
value sˆ0.
4. The e-value ev(H0) is computed via numerical in-
tegration of the posterior density estimate pˆ(θ|x)
over the tangential set T (H0), which is deter-
mined via a linear search algorithm on the vector
1 If the posterior is available in closed form, one can
directly sample from it and provide the argument with
the samples.
posteriorDensityDraws by including all values
θ which fulfill the condition sˆ(θ) > sˆ0.
5. The p-value associated with the e-value ev(H0)
in favour of the null hypothesis H0 and the stan-
dardized e-values sev(H0) are computed.
In summary, the FBST is based only on simple nu-
merical optimization and integration which makes it
a computationally cheap option. This is a benefit,
in particular, when the parameter space Θ is high-
dimensional Pereira and Stern (2020); Stern (2003);
Kelter (2020a). Also, the presence of nuisance pa-
rameters does not trouble the computation unlike it
is the case for example for the Bayes factor, as com-
puting the marginal likelihoods can quickly become
difficult then (Stern, 2003).
Example 1: Two-sample Bayesian t-test
As a preliminary note, all analyses can be repro-
duced by following the provided code.2. To demon-
strate how to use the fbst package, we start with
the two-sample t-test, a widely used statistical model
in the cognitive sciences (Nuijten et al., 2016). We
use the two-sample Bayesian t-test of Rouder et al.
(2009) together with simulated data. The recom-
mended medium Cauchy prior C(0,
√
2/2) was as-
signed to the effect size δ. Observations in the first
group were simulated as N (0, 1.7), and observations
belonging to the second group were generated ac-
cording to the N (0.8, 3) distribution. As a conse-
quence, the resulting true effect size δ according to
Cohen (1988) is given as
δ =
0− 0.8√
(1.72 + 32)/2
≈ −0.33
which equals a small effect size. The code to simulate
the data is given in listing 2.
Listing 2 Example 1 - Simulation of data
1 set.seed (57)
2 grp1=rnorm (18 ,0 ,1.7)
3 grp2=rnorm (18 ,0.8 ,3)
The corresponding Bayes factor BF10 for the alter-
native hypothesisH1 : δ 6= 0 against the null hypoth-
esis H0 : δ = 0 is given as BF10 = 0.91, which does
not indicate evidence worth mentioning according to
Jeffreys (1961) or van Doorn et al. (2019). The slight
favour towards H0 can be attributed to the medium
2 However, a supplementary replication codebook is pro-
vided at the Open Science Foundation under https://
osf.io/u6xnc/.
8Cauchy prior used, which centres the prior proba-
bility mass closely around small effect sizes (and no
effect, too). Figure 2 shows a prior-posterior plot for
the example. The code to compute the Bayes factor
is given in listing 3.
Listing 3 Example 1 - Producing the posterior distribu-
tion of the effect size and hypothesis testing via the Bayes
factor
1 install.packages("BayesFactor")
2 library(BayesFactor)
3 p = BayesFactor :: ttestBF(x=grp1 ,y=grp2 ,
posterior = TRUE , iterations =
3000000 , rscale = "medium")
4 p = as.vector(p[,4])
5
6 BF_10 = BayesFactor :: ttestBF(x=grp1 ,y=
grp2 , posterior = FALSE ,
7 rscale = "medium", paired = FALSE)
8 BF_10
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
δ
de
ns
ity
Prior
Posterior
Fig. 2 Prior-posterior plot for Example 1
To perform the FBST and compute the e-value,
we first install and load the R package from CRAN
by executing the code in listing 4.
Listing 4 Example 1 - Hypothesis testing via the Bayes
factor
1 install.packages("fbst")
2 library(fbst)
3 resFlatSim = fbst(
posteriorDensityDraws = p,
nullHypothesisValue = 0,
dimensionTheta = 3, dimensionNullset =
2)
Note that in the example, the parameter space Θ
consists of three parameters: The mean µ1 in the
first group, the mean µ2 in the second group, and the
standard deviation σ2. As a consequence, the argu-
ment dimensionTheta is therefore set to dimensionTheta=3.
The null set ΘH0 consists of the set {µ1 = µ2, σ2},
which is two-dimensional so that dimensionNullset
= 2. The object stored in the variable resFlatSim
is an object of the class fbst, which stores several
values used in the summary() and plot() functions
of the package. These are available to communicate
and visualise the results of the FBST. For example,
we can access the e-value ev(H0) as follows (see list-
ing 5):
Listing 5 Example 1 - The Bayesian e-value against the
null hypothesis of no effect
1 resFlatSim@eValue
2 [1] 0.8305998
Instead of accessing each attribute manually, to ob-
tain a summary of the FBST and print the relevant
quantities the summary() function of the fbst pack-
age provides a more convenient option:
Listing 6 Example 1 - Using the summary() function on
an fbst object
1 summary(resFlatSim)
2
3 Full Bayesian Significance Test for
testing a sharp hypothesis against its
alternative:
4 Reference function: Flat
5 Testing Hypothesis H_0: Parameter= 0
against its alternative H_1
6 Bayesian e-value against H_0:
0.8305998
7 p-value associated with the Bayesian
e-value in favour of the null
hypothesis: 0.1461029
8 Standardized e-value: 0.0248695
Based on the results, we can see that there is some
evidence against the null hypothesis according to the
Bayesian e-value ev(H0) against H0 (compare equa-
tion (5)). The corresponding p-value ev0 ≈ 0.146 is
not significant if a standard threshold of 0.05 is used,
but the standardized e-value sev(H0) ≈ 0.025 < 0.05
is. Note that when a p-value is used for hypothe-
sis testing, it is recommended to use the standard-
ized e-value Borges and Stern (2007); Pereira and
Stern (2020), so one would reject the null hypothesis
H0 : δ = 0 in this case. However, it is also possible
to use only the Bayesian evidence ev(H0) against H0
9without any p-value to quantify the evidence contin-
uously.
To visualise the results, we use the plot() func-
tion of the fbst package:
Listing 7 Example 1 - Hypothesis testing via the Bayes
factor
1 plot(resFlatSim)
The result is shown in figure 3a: The blue shaded
area under the surprise function (which is by default
the posterior distribution, that is, a flat reference
function r(δ) = 1 is used by default by the fbst()
function) is the Bayesian evidence against H0, the
e-value ev(H0) ≈ 0.83 (compare listing 6). The red
shaded area is the e-value ev(H0) in favour of H0,
which is ev(H0) ≈ 1 − 0.83 = 0.17. Instead of a
flat reference function r(δ) = 1, one could also use a
more reasonable prior distribution. For example, as
small to medium effect sizes are to be expected in
the cognitive sciences and psychology, Rouder et al.
(2009) recommended to use a medium Cauchy prior
C(0,
√
2/2) as a default prior on the effect size. To
see if parameter values δ have been corroborated
(compared to this prior assumption) by observing
the data, we can use this prior as the reference func-
tion r(δ) = C(0,
√
2/2), and the resulting surprise
function is shown in figure 3b. The code to produce
the FBST based on a Cauchy reference density is
given in listing 8:
Listing 8 Example 1 - The FBST using a medium
Cauchy prior as reference function
1 resMediumSim = fbst(
posteriorDensityDraws = p,
nullHypothesisValue = 0,
dimensionTheta = 3, dimensionNullset =
2, FUN=dcauchy , par = list(location =
0, scale = sqrt (2)/2))
2
3 summary(resMediumSim)
4 Full Bayesian Significance Test for
testing a sharp hypothesis against its
alternative:
5 Reference function: User -defined
6 Testing Hypothesis H_0: Parameter= 0
against its alternative H_1
7 Bayesian e-value against H_0:
0.9032063
8 p-value associated with the Bayesian
e-value in favour of the null
hypothesis: 0.1461029
9 Standardized e-value: 0.01189972
There, the FUN argument is supplied with the name
of the density to be used and the par argument
is supplied with a list of arguments for this den-
sity. As the Cauchy distribution has a location and
scale parameter, we supply these here. Notice that
the blue point which indicates the surprise function
value s(0) of the null hypothesis parameter δ = 0 is
larger than one. This means that the null hypothesis
value has been corroborated by the data. However,
all parameter values in the tangential set have been
corroborated even more by the data than the null
value δ = 0.
Based on the continuous quantification, there is
again strong evidence against the null hypothesis
when changing the reference function to a medium
Cauchy prior: More than 90% of the posterior dis-
tribution’s parameter values attain a larger surprise
function value than the null hypothesis value. The
resulting standardized e-value sev(H0) is also signif-
icant.
Example 2: Directional two-sample Bayesian
t-test
Example 1 showed how to apply the FBST in the
setting of the Bayesian two-sample t-test. Example
2 is a slight modification of Example 1. Instead of
testing a two-sided hypothesis, we now turn to di-
rectional hypotheses and show how these can easily
be tested via the fbst package, too. We use data
of Moore et al. (2012), which provides the reading
performance of two groups of pupils: One control
group and a treatment group which was given di-
rected reading activities. The data are freely avail-
able in the built-in data library of the open-source
software JASP3. We test the hypothesis H0 : δ < 0,
which is equivalent to the hypothesis H0 : µ1 < µ2,
where the measured quantity is the performance of
pupils in the degree of reading power test (DRP)
(Moore et al., 2012).
First, we save the data in a .csv-file (which is
called DirectedReadingActivities.csv in listing
9), set the working directory and load the data4:
Listing 9 Example 2 - Loading the data
1 setwd(’ ... ’) # Change to where the data
are stored on your machine
2 library(dplyr)
3 dra=read.csv("DirectedReadingActivities.
csv",sep=",")
4 head(dra)
5
6 id group g drp
7 1 1 Treat 0 24
3 See www.jasp-stats.org
4 The data set is also provided as a .csv-file at the OSF
repository https://osf.io/u6xnc/.
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Fig. 3 (a) Visualisation of the FBST for the Bayesian two-sample t-test in Example 1 using a flat reference function
r(δ) = 1; (b) Visualisation of the FBST for the Bayesian two-sample t-test in Example 1 using a medium Cauchy prior
as reference function r(δ) = C(0,
√
2/2)
8 2 2 Treat 0 56
9 3 3 Treat 0 43
10 4 4 Treat 0 59
11 5 5 Treat 0 58
12 6 6 Treat 0 52
13
14 treat = (dra %>% filter(group =="Treat")
%>% select(drp))$drp
15 control = (dra %>% filter(group=="Control
") %>% select(drp))$drp
The code to perform a standard hypothesis test based
on the Bayes factor is given in listing 10, which re-
sults in BF10 = 4.32, indicating moderate evidence
for the alternative H1 : δ < 0 according to van Doorn
et al. (2019).
Listing 10 Example 2 - Obtaining the posterior distri-
bution of the effect size and standard Bayesian hypothesis
testing via the Bayes factor
1 library(BayesFactor)
2 # BF closed -form of Rouder et al. (2009)
3 p = BayesFactor :: ttestBF(x=control ,y=
treat , posterior = TRUE , rscale = "
medium", paired = FALSE , nullInterval
= c(-Inf ,0), iterations = 3000000)
4 p = as.vector(p[,4])
5
6 BF_10 = BayesFactor :: ttestBF(x=control ,y=
treat , posterior = FALSE , rscale = "
medium", paired = FALSE , nullInterval
= c(-Inf ,0))
7 BF_10[1]
8
9 Bayes factor analysis
10 --------------
11 [1] Alt., r=0.707 -Inf <d<0 : 4.327919 0
%
12
13 Against denominator:
14 Null , mu1 -mu2 = 0
15 ---
16 Bayes factor type: BFindepSample , JZS
The code to perform the FBST with a flat reference
function r(δ) = 1 is given in listing 11:
Listing 11 Example 2 - Performing the FBST
1 library(fbst)
2 resFlatDRA = fbst(posteriorDensityDraws =
p, nullHypothesisValue = 0,
dimensionTheta = 3, dimensionNullset =
2)
3 summary(resFlatDRA)
4
5 Full Bayesian Significance Test for
testing a sharp hypothesis against its
alternative:
6 Reference function: Flat
7 Testing Hypothesis H_0: Parameter= 0
against its alternative H_1
8 Bayesian e-value against H_0: 0.9859827
9 p-value associated with the Bayesian e-
value in favour of the null hypothesis
: 0.06689926
10 Standardized e-value: 0.001123303
11
The dimensions of Θ and ΘH0 are identical to Ex-
ample 1, and the Bayesian e-value ev(H0) ≈ 0.986
expresses strong evidence against the null hypothesis
H0 : δ = 0. Also, the standardized e-value sev(H0) ≈
0.001 < 0.05 is significant and leads to the same con-
clusion if a threshold of 0.05 is applied. The results
are visualised in figure 4. Figure 4a shows the FBST
when a wide half-Cauchy prior C+(0, 1) is used as the
reference function r(δ) (Rouder et al., 2009)5. Fig-
ure 4a is produced by the code in listing 12, where
the additional parameter rightBoundary = 0 needs
to be added to inform the plot() function that a
one-sided hypothesis was used. Should the alterna-
tive be H1 : δ > 0, one would supply the argument
leftBoundary = 0 to the plot() function.
Listing 12 Example 2 - Visualising the FBST
1 plot(resFlatDRA , rightBoundary = 0)
Based on the continuous quantification of evidence
against H0 in form of ev(H0) and the standardized
e-value sev(H0) one would reject the null hypothesis
H0 : δ = 0 in favour of the alternative H1 : δ < 0.
That is, the performance in the treatment group is
better than in the control group which was not given
directed reading activities.
Example 3: Bayesian logistic regression
As a third example, we demonstrate how to use the
FBST via the fbst package in the context of the
Bayesian logistic regression model (McElreath, 2020).
Notice that while we focus on the standard logistic
model here, the procedure is applicable to any re-
gression model of interest like probit or linear re-
gression models. We use data from the Western Col-
laborative Group Study (WCGS) of Rosenman et al.
(1975), in which 3154 healthy young men aged 39−
59 from the San Francisco area were assessed for
their personality type. All were free from coronary
heart disease at the start of the research. Eight and a
half years later change in this situation was recorded.
We use a subset of n = 3140 participants, where 14
participants have been excluded because of incom-
plete data. The data set is freely available in the
faraway R package, so we first load and prepare the
data as shown in listing 13.
Listing 13 Example 3 - Loading the data
1 library(faraway)
5 A left-half Cauchy prior is used, as under H1 : δ < 0,
so a priori only negative effect sizes are assumed under the
alternative hypothesis.
2 data(wcgs)
3 wcgs = wcgs[complete.cases(wcgs), ]
For illustration purposes, we use a Bayesian logistic
regression model which studies the influence of the
covariates age, height, weight, systolic blood pres-
sure (sdp), diastolic blood pressure (dbp), fasting
serum cholesterol (chol) and the number of cigarettes
smoked per day (cigs) on the outcome chronic heart
disease (yes / no, variable chd) stored in the response
variable chd.
The model is fit via the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
sampler Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017; Kelter, 2020c)
which uses the No-U-Turn sampler of Hoffman and
Gelman (2014) to sample from the posterior dis-
tribution. We obtain the posterior distribution of
the intercept and the seven regression coefficients
β1, ..., β7, belonging to the six covariates included
in the model. The default weakly informative σ ∼
exp(1) prior is assigned to the standard deviation σ,
see Gabry and Goodrich (2020). We use the rstanarm
package (Goodrich et al., 2020) for fitting the Bayesian
logistic regression model, and the code to prepare the
data for Stan is given in listing 14.
Listing 14 Example 3 - Preparing the data for Stan
1 f1 = as.formula(paste(’chd ~ age + height
+ weight + sdp + dbp + chol + cigs’))
2 X1 <- model.matrix(f1, wcgs) # build
model matrix
3 standata_m1 <- list(y = as.numeric(wcgs$
chd)-1, X = X1, N = nrow(X1), P = ncol
(X1)) # format data as list for Stan
4 stan_df1 <- as.data.frame(standata_m1)
The standard weakly informative prior distribution
βj ∼ N (0, 2.5) is assigned to the regression coeffi-
cients βj , j = 1, ..., 7, and the intercept β0 is assigned
the weakly informative default prior β0 ∼ N (0, 10)
recommended by Gabry and Goodrich (2020). List-
ing 15 shows the code to fit the model via the rstanarm
package, summarise and plot the results.
Listing 15 Example 3 - Fitting the Bayesian logistic re-
gression model via Stan
1 library(rstanarm)
2 post_m1 <- stan_glm(f1, data = wcgs ,
3 family = binomial(link = "logit"),
4 prior = normal (0 ,2.5),
5 prior_intercept = normal (0,10),
6 QR=TRUE ,
7 iter = 4000,
8 seed = 4711)
9
10 summary(post_m1)
11
12 Model Info:
13 function: stan_glm
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Fig. 4 (a) Visualisation of the FBST in Example 2 for the Bayesian two-sample t-test for testing H0 : δ = 0 against
the one-sided hypothesis H1 : δ < 0, using a flat reference function r(δ) = 1; (b) Visualisation of the FBST in Example
2 for the Bayesian two-sample t-test for testing H0 : δ = 0 against the one-sided hypothesis H1 : δ < 0, using a wide
Cauchy prior reference function r(δ) = C(0, 1)
14 family: binomial [logit]
15 formula: chd ~ age + height +
weight + sdp + dbp + chol + cigs
16 algorithm: sampling
17 sample: 8000 (posterior sample
size)
18 priors: see help(’prior_summary ’)
19 observations: 3140
20 predictors: 8
21
22 plot(post_m1 , "areas", prob = 0.95, prob_
outer = 1, pars=c("age", "height", "
weight", "sdp", "dbp", "chol", "cigs")
)
Figure 5 shows the marginal posterior distributions
of the regression coefficients βj for the Bayesian lo-
gistic regression model in Example 3. To compute
the FBST on the regression coefficients, we need to
extract the posterior MCMC sample first, as shown
in listing 16. For illustration purposes, we conduct
the FBST on the regression coefficient belonging to
the covariate weight. The FBST is computed using a
normal prior N (0, 2.5) as reference function, which
was also used to fit the model. This way, the surprise
function quantifies which parameter values βj have
been corroborated more by observing the data than
the null value βj = 0.
Listing 16 Example 3 - Extracting the posterior MCMC
draws, performing the FBST and visualising the result
1 posteriorDrawsMatrix = as.matrix(post
_m1)
2 weightDraws = posteriorDrawsMatrix
[,4]
3
4 resWeight = fbst(
posteriorDensityDraws = weightDraws ,
nullHypothesisValue = 0,
dimensionTheta = 8, dimensionNullset =
7, FUN=dnorm , par = list(mean = 0, sd
= 2.5))
5 # Bayesian evidence against null
hypothesis
6 resWeight@eValue
7 [1] 0.9758885
8 # Standardized e-value
9 resWeight@sev_H_0
10 [1] 0.00002672151
11
12 plot(resWeight)
The results are also shown in figure 6, which is pro-
duced via the plot() function call in listing 16. Based
on the standardized e-value sev(H0) ≈ 0.0000267
and the Bayesian evidence against H0, the e-value
ev(H0) ≈ 0.9759 one would reject the null hypothe-
sis H0 : βj = 0.
13
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Fig. 5 Marginal posterior distributions of the regression coefficients βj in the Bayesian logistic regression model in
Example 3
Discussion
This paper introduced the R package fbst for com-
puting the Full Bayesian Significance Test and the e-
value for testing a sharp hypothesis against the alter-
native. The conceptual approach and the statistical
theory of the FBST were detailed, and three exam-
ples of statistical models frequently used in psychol-
ogy and the cognitive sciences highlighted how the
FBST can be computed in practice via the fbst R
package. It was shown that both one-sided and two-
sided hypotheses can be tested with the fbst pack-
age. The package’s core function fbst() requires
only a posterior MCMC sample so it should be ap-
plicable to a wide range of statistical models used
in the cognitive sciences and psychology. The ex-
amples demonstrated that it is simple to combine
the FBST via the fbst package with widely used li-
braries like rstanarm (Goodrich et al., 2020) or the
BayesFactor package (Morey and Rouder, 2018).
The provided summary and plot functions in the
package allow intuitive use and produce appealing
visualisation of the FBST results which simplifies
sharing and communication of the results with col-
leagues. We omitted simulation studies in this pa-
per, because these were recently conducted by Kel-
ter (2020a) to which the interested reader is referred.
For more details on the theoretical properties of the
FBST, we also refer the reader to Pereira and Stern
(2020).
To conclude, we direct attention to some limita-
tions and possible extensions of the FBST and the
fbst package presented in this paper. First, the fbst
package is widely applicable but this strength can
also be interpreted as a limitation. The fbst pack-
age requires a posterior distribution which has been
derived analytically or numerically to conduct the
FBST and compute the e-value, so it is not a stan-
dalone solution.
Second, the core functionality in the current form
is restricted to computing, summarising and visu-
alising the FBST. Future extensions could include
more detailed analysis results like robustness checks
depending on the reference function used, see van
Doorn et al. (2019). Also, in its current form the
package uses only posterior MCMC draws, and fu-
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Fig. 6 Visualisation of the FBST for H0 : βj = 0 against H1 : βj 6= 0 for the regression coefficient of the covariate
weight in the Bayesian logistic regression model for the WCGS study
ture versions could provide the option to provide
the posterior as a closed-form function. Another op-
tion to extend the functionality would be to make
various algorithms available to estimate the poste-
rior density based on the posterior draws: By now,
only Gaussian kernel density estimation is used. In
small sample situations the asymptotics of Bayesian
posterior distributions guaranteed by the Bernstein-
von-Mises theorem can be questionable and other
approaches like spline-based interpolation or non-
Gaussian kernels may be more useful.
Third, while the standardized e-values may be
used as a replacement of frequentist p-values, they
are also based on asymptotic arguments and future
research is needed to study the behaviour of the stan-
dardized e-values sev(H0) for small samples. This
is why we recommend a continuous interpretation
of the Bayesian e-value ev(H0) over a threshold-
oriented interpretation via standardized e-values sev(H0).
In closing, it must be emphasized that we do
not argue against the appropriate use of p-values,
Bayes factors or any other suitable method of hy-
pothesis testing. However, the ongoing debate about
the concept of statistical significance shows that it is
useful to explore existing alternatives for statistical
hypothesis testing and investigate the relationships
between these approaches both from a theoretical
and practical perspective (Berger and Sellke, 1987;
Makowski et al., 2019b; Liao et al., 2020). The fbst
R package introduced in this paper could contribute
in particular to the former, as simulation studies can
easily be carried out by employing the package, see
for example Kelter (2020a).
There is much value in testing a sharp null hy-
pothesis against its alternative in the cognitive sci-
ences and psychology (Berger et al., 1994, 1997; Rouder
et al., 2009). While there are also other useful ap-
proaches such as equivalence testing – see Lakens
(2017); Lakens et al. (2018); Kruschke and Liddell
(2018b); Kruschke (2018) – the FBST has shown to
be an attractive alternative to NHST and p-values
with desirable theoretical and practical properties
(Kelter, 2020a; Pereira and Stern, 2020; Esteves et al.,
2019). It is hoped that this package will be useful to
researchers from the cognitive sciences and psychol-
ogists who are interested in a fully Bayesian alter-
15
native to null hypothesis significance testing which
requires little methodological changes, but offers all
the benefits of a fully Bayesian data analysis.
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